ABSTRACT
This article addresses whether the WTO should extend permanent observer status to multilateral
environmental agreements and analyzes the impact of injecting environmental issues into the multilateral trading
system. The paper begins with a chronological analysis of the transition from the GATT governance of international
trade to the formation of the WTO and will also examine influences upon the formation and the agenda of the
Committee on Trade and the Environment. The discussion continues with a look at the Committee on Trade and the
Environment’s first year of progress and discussion of the critical report entitled Special Studies 4: Trade and the
Environment. Following an evaluation of the impact of the first four WTO Ministerial Conferences is a discussion
of the mechanics of the GATT’s anti-discrimination provisions and environmental exceptions. Next, the discussion
is supplemented by an analysis of international case law interpreting the environmental exceptions contained in
GATT. The paper then proceeds to investigate the structure and function of the different types of trade provisions in
several multilateral environmental agreements and their impact on the multilateral trading system. Furthermore, the
article conducts a chronological analysis of the struggle endured by multilateral environmental agreements to
acquire observer status in the WTO and the relevant implications of their participation in WTO proceedings.
Finally, the author explores proposed solutions and attempts to achieve harmony between trade and the environment.
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WILL THE WTO TURN GREEN?
THE IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDING OBSERVER STATUS TO MULTILATERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
Richard Skeen †
I.

INTRODUCTION

The first attempt to govern international trade resulted in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947.1 Environmental issues had not yet emerged in the
international context, and environmental organizations such as Greenpeace did not exist in
developed countries at that time.2 The 1972 Conference on the Human Environment introduced
a new issue into multilateral trade negotiations.3 Environmental issues started to slowly
penetrate domestic and international policy during the mid-1970s.4 In 1991, the GATT
contracting parties convened the Working Group on Environmental Measures, which formally
established environmental issues within the multilateral trading system.5 The emphasis on the
environment continued at Marrakesh with the formation of the World Trade Organization’s
(WTO) Committee on Trade and the Environment (CTE).6 However, environmental concerns
sometimes conflict with the goals of multilateral trade, and these discrepancies have created a
dispute regarding the relevance and importance of incorporating environmental issues into
modern trade negotiations. The two factions (environmentalist and trade purist) have become
deeply entrenched in the debate over the level of involvement multilateral environmental
agreements (MEA) should play in the World Trade Organization.
† Jurist Doctorate, University of Tulsa College of Law, Tulsa Oklahoma, expected graduation May 2005; Bachelor
of Science, Accounting, the Ohio State University, Columbus Ohio, 2002. The author would like to dedicate this
comment to his mother Judy Skeen and father Richard Skeen for their love and support, which made this comment
possible.
1
See discussion infra Part II.A.
2
Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of the
WTO’s Treatment of Environmental Matter, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, (2001).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
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The WTO Members at the Ministerial Conference at Doha, Qatar in 2001 committed to
resolve issues including those regarding trade and the environment by January 1, 2005.7 The
Doha Ministerial Declaration stresses the significance of clarifying the relationship between
WTO trade rules and the trade measures contained in MEAs.8 The declaration also pinpoints
both information exchange and the establishment of procedures for granting observer status to
MEAs as areas of primary concern.9 However, Members failed to reach a consensus at the
recent Cancún Ministerial Conference in 2003, and these important issues were left unresolved.10
This comment addresses whether the WTO should extend permanent observer status to
multilateral environmental agreements and analyzes the impact of injecting environmental issues
into the multilateral trading system. Part II will chronicle the transition from the GATT
governance of international trade to the formation of the WTO and will also examine the
influences upon the formation of the Committee on Trade and the Environment and its agenda.
The discussion in Part III will assess the Committee on Trade and the Environment’s first year of
progress and will discuss a critical report entitled Special Studies 4: Trade and the Environment.
Part III will continue with an analysis of the relevant implications of the first four Ministerial
Conferences. Part IV will outline the mechanics of the GATT’s anti-discrimination provisions
and related environmental exceptions. The discussion of the GATT will be supplemented by an
analysis of international case law interpreting the environmental exceptions. Part V will
investigate the structure and function of the different types of trade provisions contained in

6

See discussion infra Parts II.B-C.

7

See WTO Ministerial Conference 4th Sess. Doha, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 para. 31,32,45
(Nov. 20 2001) http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Doha, Ministerial Declaration].
8
Id. para 31.
9
Id. para. 31.
10
See WTO Cancún 5th Ministerial Conference, Summary of September 14, 2003,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_14sept_e.htm, (last visited Oct. 29, 2003)
[hereinafter Summary of September 14, 2003].
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multilateral environmental agreements and their impact on the multilateral trading system. Part
VI will begin with chronological analysis of the struggle to acquire observer status for
multilateral environmental agreements and will then consider the relevant implications of their
participation in the WTO proceedings. Finally, Part VII will explore proposed solutions and
attempt to achieve harmony between trade and the environment.
II.

THE HISTORY OF THE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT FROM GATT TO THE WTO

A. The UN, the ITO, and Birth of GATT
During the 1940s, war caused extensive devastation to economic and domestic
infrastructures across Europe and Southeast Asia. This brought about dramatic social, economic
and political changes throughout the world. The task of rebuilding dominated national concerns
and required massive amounts of labor, capital, and materials to traverse international borders.11
In response to these concerns, the United States led an effort to harmonize world economic
affairs.12 The dilemma of conducting trade efficiently in the postwar economy was discussed at
Bretton Woods in 1944, and sparked an effort to found an international organization charged
with the development and coordination of international trade.13
Fifty-one states concerned with postwar political and economic instability formed the
United Nations (UN) in 1945 and assigned certain focus areas to each of its three councils.14 The
Economic and Social Council supported the development of an international organization to

11

See generally MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY
(2003) 1-2.
12
See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS CASES,
MATERIALS AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION O F TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 211-16 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing the weaknesses of the bilateral system of negotiating tariffs and the
related implications of the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and the 1945 Act to Extend the Authority of the
President Under section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930).
13
See MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 1-9 (analyzing WTO formation, law, policy, and practice).
14
See The UN in Brief, at http://www.un.org/Overview/brief1.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2003) (providing a
description of the history and formation of the United Nations).
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conduct multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the UN.15 The UN adopted a
resolution in 1946 to undertake the formation of the International Trade Organization (ITO).16
The process consisted of several stages, including a pivotal one in Geneva, where the schedules
of tariff reductions and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade were prepared.17 The
original twenty-two states that wanted to adopt the tariff schedules of the GATT signed the
“Protocol of Provisional Application” to apply the GATT.18 The agreement became effective on
January 1, 1948 but the signatories only intended it to govern trade until the ITO Charter could
be adopted.19 The drafting committee finished the ITO Charter in Havana, Cuba during 1948,
but it was never adopted by the United States due to strong opposition from the Truman
Administration and a Republican-controlled Congress.20 The ITO ultimately floundered because
the United States failed to lend the necessary support, which would have ensured its adoption by
the rest of major trading nations.21
Although it was only intended to be a temporary solution, the GATT became the default
instrument for international trade negotiations and regulation for over forty years.22 The drafters
of the GATT never intended it to serve as an international organization, and consequently it
suffered from some inherent weaknesses, including the lack of any legal identity or
organizational structure.23 These failings led to ambiguity about the GATT’s authority and
ability to regulate trade. 24 Despite the aforementioned flaws, the GATT remained the dominant

15

MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 1.
Id.
17
Id. at 2.
18
JACKSON, supra note 12, at 213.
19
Id.
20
MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 2.
21
Id.
22
JACKSON, supra note 12, at 216.
23
Id. at 214-16.
24
Id.
16
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forum for trade negotiations and fostered eight “rounds” of multilateral trade discussions, which
lowered tariffs and eliminated other international trade barriers.25
B. The Uruguay Round and the Formation of the WTO
1. The Birth of the WTO
Globalization of the world economy facilitated the need for a stronger international body
to not only advance but also govern international trade.26 The contracting parties of the GATT
met in Marrakesh, Uruguay for a trade round, which lasted from 1986 to 1994 and hatched
negotiations that produced several agreements signed on April 15, 1994.27 The summit at
Marrakesh culminated in the formation of the World Trade Organization on January 1, 1995.28
The contracting parties drafted the Agreement to form the WTO (WTO Agreement) and four
annexes:
ANNEX 1
ANNEX 1A: Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods
.
.
.
ANNEX 1B: General Agreements on Trade in Services [GATS] and Annexes
ANNEX 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS]
ANNEX 2
Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
ANNEX 3
Trade Policy Review Mechanism [TPRM]
ANNEX 4
Plurilateral Trade Agreements [PTA]29

The organizational structure of the WTO requires that every member state comply with
each of the aforementioned agreements and annexes.30 The entire text, including agreements and
annexes, operates as one whole body of law, subject to the exception of Annex 4, which is
optional.31 The WTO Agreement requires Members to adhere to the entirety of the Uruguay

25

MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 5.
See id. at 1-3.
27
Id. at 7.
28
Id.
29
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. (1994) 1125, 1153[hereinafter Final Act].
30
MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 7-8.
31
Id.; see also JACKSON, supra note 12, at 219-20.
26
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Round text and all subsequent negotiations ending in consensus.32 This greatly departs from the
GATT system of rules allowing contracting parties to make side agreements or accept the GATT
in fragments, which became especially problematic at the Tokyo Round.33
However, Annex 4, which originally contained four PTA agreements, is reminiscent of
the GATT style of governance because Members can choose to opt out of the PTA.34 The PTA
agreements are either aimed primarily at several countries, or are mainly “hortatory,” and simply
urge action; however, when the ability to create additions to Annex 4 is considered the possible
environmental impact becomes evident.35 Annex 4’s departure from the traditional
organizational structure enables flexibility for the evolution of WTO involvement into
nontraditional areas while still preserving the rigid structure of the WTO.36 Annex 4 could serve
as a staging area for environmentally related trade agreements to gain force and support while
bypassing the inherent obstacles in the Committee on Trade and the Environment and Article
XX.37
2. The Function of the WTO
The WTO objectives include: (1) facilitating, implementing and administering WTO
agreements, the Multilateral Trade Agreements and the Plurality Trade Agreements; (2)
providing a forum for trade negotiation; (3) administering the Dispute Settlement Understanding;
(4) administering the Trade Policy Review Mechanism; and (5) cooperating with the World
Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other international organizations.38 Unlike the GATT,

32

See JACKSON, supra note 12, at 219.
Id.
34
Id. at 220. Only the governmental procurement agreement and the trade in civil aircraft agreement remain in
force; the bovine meat and dairy products agreements were deleted. Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
See JACKSON, supra note 12, at 220.
38
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, art. III, paras.1-5 33 I.L.M.
1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
33
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the WTO possesses legal personality39 and a much more powerful dispute resolution system with
which to accomplish its objectives.40
3. The Organizational Structure
The WTO is organized in a hierarchy of conferences and councils. The Ministerial
Conference, composed of all WTO Members, is the upper echelon and must meet at least once
every two years.41 The General Council is also composed of all the Members and meets between
Ministerial Conference sessions to conduct any pressing administrative functions.42
Furthermore, the General Council discharges the duties of the Trade Review Policy Body and
also acts as the Dispute Settlement Body, which is composed of both the dispute settlement panel
and the Appellate Body. 43 The next level in the hierarchy consists of three separate councils that
must report to the General Council.44 Each council covers one broad area of trade: (1) the Goods
Council; (2) Services Council; and (3) TRIPS Council.45 The WTO Agreement gives each
council the ability to create subdivisions, called committees, which deal with more specific
aspects of the respective broad area of trade, and the committees may be further divided into
working groups to address specialized issues.46 In addition, several committees (including the
Committee on Trade and the Environment) do not fall under any of the three councils and answer
directly to the General Council.47

39

Id. art. VIII, para. 1.
See generally TRADING INTO THE FUTURE: WTO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 38 (2nd ed. 1999)
[hereinafter TRADING] (describing the dispute resolution process as equitable fast, effective, and mutually
acceptable). When a trade violation is suspected members must submit to the multilateral dispute resolution system
which is binding. Unlike GATT, the adoption of WTO enforcement rulings cannot be blocked by the losing party or
any other member. Id.
41
WTO Agreement, supra note 38, art. IV, para. 1.
42
Id. art. IV, para. 2.
43
Id. art. IV, paras. 3-4.
44
Id. art. IV, para. 5.
45
Id.
46
Id. art. IV, para. 6.
47
WTO Agreement, supra note 38, art. IV, para. 8; see also TRADING supra note 40, at 62.
40

9

C. The Multilateral Trading System Acknowledges Environmental Issues
1. Establishing the Committee on Trade and the Environment
WTO Members are deeply divided over whether to incorporate environmental issues into
the multilateral trading system. Environmentalists and their opponents have struggled with this
question in the international forum since the 1970s when these issues emerged.48 The perplexing
question of whether to commingle environmental issues with trade is not easily answered by
either faction. Environmentalists are critical of the current multilateral trading regime. They
claim that without environmental safeguards trade will generate rampant growth causing
unsustainable natural resource consumption and waste production.49 Environmentalists are also
concerned that without environmental protections built into the multilateral trading scheme; trade
liberalization and market access agreements might trump environmental policy.50 The GATT
contracting parties have been extremely divided over this issue.51 They agreed to form the
Working Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade in 1971; however, it was
not convened for the first time, until twenty years later.52
2. Points of Reference
The Ministers to the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negations at Marrakesh
(Ministers) formally decided on April 14, 1994 to direct the WTO to establish a Committee on
Trade and the Environment at the General Council’s first meeting.53 The Ministers cited their
authority to create, and the need for establishing the CTE, by looking to the preamble to the
Agreement Establishing the WTO:
[R]elations in the field of trade and economic endeavour [sic] should be conducted with a view to
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of
48

See Shaffer, supra note 2, at 17.
Daniel C. Esty, THE GREENING OF THE GATT 42 (1994).
50
Id.
51
See Shaffer, supra note 2, at 17.
52
Id. at 17-19.
53
See Trade and Environment, Decision of April 14, 1994, MTN.TNC/MIN, 33 I.L.M. 1263, 1267 (1994)
[hereinafter Decision on Trade and Environment].
49
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real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to
enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at
different levels of economic development.54

The CTE reports directly to the General Council and is open to all members of the
WTO.55 The Ministers endowed the CTE with autonomy by organizing the committee to
report directly to the General Council.56 This broadens the CTE’s scope and enables it to
undertake trade-related issues concerning goods, services, and intellectual property
without overstepping its organizational constraints.57
3. The Scope of the CTE
The Ministers had the foresight to initially limit the scope of the CTE’s
jurisdiction to “trade policies and those trade-related aspects of environmental policies
which may result in significant trade effects for its members.”58 The Ministers set points
of reference or limitations, which were intended to preserve the integrity of the WTO
system by preventing the CTE from addressing issues unrelated to trade.59 The Ministers
quoted the Trade Negations Committee’s (TNC) Decision of December 15, 1993, which
established the following guidelines and objectives for the CTE:
(a) to identify the relationship between trade measures and environmental measures, in order to
promote sustainable development;
(b) to make appropriate recommendations on whether any modifications of the provisions of the
multilateral trading system are required, compatible with the open, equitable and nondiscriminatory nature of the system, as regards, in particular:
[1] the need for rules to enhance positive interaction between trade and environmental
measures, for the promotion of sustainable development, with special consideration to the
needs of developing countries, in particular those of the least developed among them; and
[2] the avoidance of protectionist trade measures, and the adherence to effective multilateral
disciplines to ensure responsiveness of the multilateral trading system to environmental
objectives set forth in Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration, in particular Principle 12; and
[3] surveillance of trade measures used for environmental purposes, of trade-related aspects of

54

Id. (emphasis added).
WTO Agreement, supra note 38 art. IV, para. 5.
56
See generally id.; See also TRADING supra note 40, at 61-62.
57
See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
58
Decision on Trade and Environment, supra note 53, at 1267.
59
See generally id. at 1268.
55
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environmental measures which have significant trade effects, and of effective implementation
of the multilateral disciplines governing those measures.60

The language of the preamble to the Agreement Establishing the WTO in conjunction
with the TNC Decision provided the CTE with its initial points reference to engage and
address environmental issues within the WTO.61
4. The CTE’s Agenda
Initially, the formation of the CTE came from a push by developed nations such as the
United States and the European Union to both placate environmentalists and subject the recent
proliferation of environmental regulation62 threatening free trade to greater control under the
GATT.63 The bifurcation of motivation to establish the CTE led to the balancing of
North/South64 interests in the agenda items of the committee.65 The Ministers delineated ten
areas of initial inquiry for the CTE’s agenda:
[1] the relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and trade measures
for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral environmental agreements;
[2] the relationship between environmental policies relevant to trade and environmental measures
with significant trade effects and the provisions of the multilateral trading system;
[3] the relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and:
(a) charges and taxes for environmental purposes
(b) requirements for environmental purposes relating to products, including standards and
technical regulations, packaging, labelling [sic] and recycling;
[4] the provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to the transparency of trade
measures used for environmental purposes and environmental measures and requirements which
have significant trade effects;
[5] the relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms in the multilateral trading system
60

Id. The Ministers at Marrakesh chose to refer to the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development because
the language in Principle 12 tracks that of the GATT Article XX and denounces unilateral action in international
forum. “States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to
economic growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental
degradation. Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. Unilateral actions to deal with
environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided. Environmental
measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems should as far as possible, be based on
international consensus.” Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) (emphasis
added).
61
See Decision on Trade and Environment, supra note 53, at 1267-68.
62
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
63
See Shaffer, supra note 2, at 24.
64
Developed and developing countries are commonly referred to as the North and the South respectively. The terms
are used interchangeably through this article.
65
Shaffer, supra note 2, at 25.
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and those found in multilateral environmental agreements;
[6] the effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to developing
countries, in particular to the least developed among them, and environmental benefits of
removing trade restrictions and distortions;
[7] the issue of exports of domestically prohibited goods,
[8] that the Committee on Trade and Environment will consider the work programme envisaged in
the Decision on Trade in Services and the Environment and the relevant provisions of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights as an integral part of its
work, within the above terms of reference,
[9] that, pending the first meeting of the General Council of the WTO, the work of the Committee
on Trade and Environment should be carried out by a Sub-Committee of the Preparatory
Committee of the World Trade Organization (PCWTO), open to all members of the PCWTO,
[10] to invite the Sub-Committee of the Preparatory Committee, and the Committee on Trade and
Environment when it is established, to provide input to the relevant bodies in respect of
appropriate arrangements for relations with inter-governmental and non-governmental
organizations referred to in Article V of the WTO.66

The Agenda Items are composed of two major categories, including market access and
linkages between the environment and trade, and a third cluster of state specific concerns.67 The
market access agenda (items two, three, four, and six) generated a balanced discussion between
the North and South in committee meetings.68 The discussions on market access, particularly
those issues related to Agenda Item six, including agriculture and fishing, have led to the
creation of North and South partnerships.69 Agriculture exporters consisting of the United
States, Australia, New Zealand, India and several South American states joined forces and
attacked, on environmental grounds, the policies designed to protect domestic producers of the
European Union (EU) Japan, and Korea.70 Developing countries have become increasingly more
involved in environmental issues relating to trade by forming alliances with developed nations.71
III.

TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE WTO: AN INITIAL PROGRESS REPORT AND
GUIDANCE FROM THE DOHA MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE

A. The 1996 Report of the Committee on Trade and the Environment

66

Decision on Trade and Environment, supra note 53, at 1268-69.
Shaffer, supra note 2, at 25.
68
See id. at 25-29. Shaffer analyzed working papers submitted by CTE Members through the 1998 sessions, and
assembled a list categorized by country and agenda item addressed. Id.
69
Id. at 30.
70
Id.
71
Id.
67
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The Ministers required that the CTE report its findings to the General Council at its first
meeting, and in November of 1996, the CTE published its first report.72 Members offered many
proposals in the CTE meetings throughout the first year. Unfortunately, due to irreconcilable
viewpoints, Members could not reach a consensus and no actual substantive or procedural
changes were implemented in the WTO as a result of the report.73 Nevertheless, Members
intensely debated the drafting of the 1996 Report because it did indicate the CTE’s position on a
number of controversial topics, which would eventually influence other areas, including dispute
settlement.74
1. The Dispute Resolution Process
The report recommended that when disputes between Members occur, arising out of their
responsibilities as parties to a MEA, they should “consider trying to resolve it through the
dispute settlement mechanisms available under the MEA.”75 The committee feared that the
exclusive jurisdiction and binding nature of the WTO dispute settlement system may attract
environmentally related suits that were not the province of the WTO dispute settlement panel.76
The committee’s rationale for deferring to the MEA dispute resolution process also stems from
the concern to maintain the integrity of the WTO dispute resolution system, which evidences the
WTO’s reluctance to police environmental issues.77 At this developmental stage supremacy of
law questions between the WTO and MEAs were uncharted territory, and the CTE wisely
advised Members not to tread there.
2. Extending Observer Status and Increasing Transparency
72

WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment, Report (1996) of the Committee on Trade and the Environment,
WT/CTE/1 para. 1 (Nov. 12 1996) http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2003) [hereinafter CTE, 1996 Report].
73
Shaffer, supra note 2, at 37.
74
Id. at 38.
75
CTE, 1996 Report, supra note 72, para. 178.
76
WTO Committee on Trade and The Environment, Enhancing Synergies and Mutual Supportiveness of MEAs and
the WTO, WT/CTE/213 para. 39 (June 12, 2002) http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct. 21, 2003) [hereinafter CTE,
Enhancing Synergies].
77
See discussion infra Part V.B; but see discussion infra Part IV.B.
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Agenda Item one requires the CTE to consider the impact of MEAs, item four relates to
increasing transparency, and item ten calls for input regarding “arrangements for relations with
inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations referred to in Article V of the WTO.”78
These Agenda Items, in conjunction with Annex 4 to the WTO Agreement set the stage for a
continuing and expanding involvement of intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and MEAs in the WTO. 79 The 1996 report, in consideration of Agenda
Item one, made several recommendations, including that “[r]equests from the appropriate bodies
of MEAs for observer status should be considered . . . . [and t]he CTE should also consider
extending invitations to appropriate MEA institutions” to participate in debates.80 The CTE
addressed Agenda Item four and concluded “that no modifications to WTO rules are required to
ensure adequate transparency for existing trade-related environmental measures”81 but invited
“other inter-governmental organizations . . . to collect and disseminate additional information on
the use of trade-related environmental measures.”82 The issue of transparency overlaps with
Agenda Item ten in which the CTE indicated its intent to “improve public access to WTO
documentation and to develop communication with NGOs”83 and de-restrict working and nonworking papers.84 The CTE will continue to interact with NGOs to enhance the “accuracy and
richness of public debate.”85 The CTE also announced that it agreed to extend permanent
observer status to inter-governmental organizations which previously participated on an ad hoc
78
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basis and also indicated that it would consider the possibility of extending observer status to
MEAs upon their request and subsequent approval by the General Council.86 The CTE
recognized that MEAs “can play a positive role in creating clearer appreciation of the mutually
supportive role of trade and environmental policies.”87
B. WTO/UNEP Joint Report Assesses Trade and the Environment
The WTO Secretariat released Special Studies 4: Trade and the Environment just weeks
before the Seattle Ministerial Conference.88 The study assesses the causes of environmental
degradation which “can often be traced back to various market failures or, equally bad, to policy
failures.”89 Market failures occur when economic forces of supply and demand do not result in
optimal outcomes for society because producers and consumers do not consider environmental
externalities.90 Five case studies in Section II of the study depict market and policy failures,
showing linkages between trade and the environment in the areas of “(A) chemical-intensive
agriculture, (B) deforestation, (C) global warming, (D) acid rain, and (E) overfishing.”91 The
study lays blame on lack of incentives to curb pollution, the failure to realize the global market
for preservation of resources, lack of resource management schemes, and government subsidies
that promote over consumption.92 The study encourages a front-end attack on pollution by
taxing emissions instead of production.93
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Furthermore, the study discusses the linkages between trade and the environment in
Section III.94 Through the use of empirical evidence, the authors determine that capital, labor,
and availability of natural resources have dominated global trade patterns and that environmental
standards have had no significant effect on these trends.95 Although, the converse is not true:
“trade liberalization can harm the local environment in countries with a comparative advantage
in polluting industries and improve the environment elsewhere.”96 However, the authors argue
that by combining trade and environmental reforms countries can increase income without
jeopardizing the environment because excess gains can be diverted to economic policy to abate
environmental degradation.97
Section IV of the study delves into the inquiry of whether economic integration induces
states to lower environmental policy.98 Theories such as “eco-dumping,” “competition in
laxity,” and “race to the bottom” are often exaggerated, and the authors have determined that the
empirical evidence does not support the contention that direct investment is fleeing developed
counties for countries with lower environmental standards.99 The authors do qualify the
contention with individual instances of industrial relocation and compromise of environmental
standards for competitive purposes.100
Section V of the study indicates that free trade may indirectly promote higher
environmental standards.101 Relying on the environmental Kuznets curve,102 the authors
94
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stipulate that studies show “pollution levels tend to be significantly higher in countries with a
skewed income distribution, a high level of illiteracy, and few political and civil liberties.”103
Finally, the study’s conclusion acknowledges the global nature of environmental
problems but downplays the WTO’s ability of handling the environmental concerns and
discourages Members’ from using trade sanctions for purposes of enforcing environmental
policy.104 The authors recommend that the WTO take steps to address and remove “trade
barriers on environmentally-friendly production technologies and environmental services” in
order to lower costs of direct investment in those technologies.105 They also call for a reduction
in energy, agricultural and fishing subsidies, which promote the overcapitalization of
resources.106
C. The WTO Ministerial Conferences
After the CTE presented its initial report to the Ministerial Conference in Singapore in
1996107 the WTO, in accordance with its bylaws, held another Ministerial Conference in Geneva
in 1998 that initiated a round of trade negotiations.108 However, in 1999 due to extensive rioting,
the Seattle Ministerial Conference was canceled and failed to give rise to another trade round of
eagerly anticipated discussions on agriculture, investment, and the environment.109
After the failed attempt at Seattle, the next major advance to the CTE’s agenda came at
the Doha Ministerial Conference in November of 2001.110 Director-General Moore, of the
WTO, termed the Ministerial Declaration the “Doha Development Agenda” to emphasize the
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focus on developing countries.111 The Ministerial Declaration’ssection on trade and
environment agrees to negotiate:
(i)

(ii)
(iii)

the relationship between existing WTO Rules and specific trade obligations set out in
multilateral environmental agreement (MEAs). The negotiations shall be limited in scope
to the applicability of such existing WTO rules as among parties to the MEA in question.
The negotiations shall not prejudice the WTO rights of any Member that is not a party to
the MEA in question;
procedures for regular information exchange between MEA Secretariats and the relevant
WTO committees, and the criteria for granting of observer status;
the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to
environmental goods and services.112

The Ministerial Declaration further instructed the CTE to pay particular attention to
several focus areas while maintaining its current terms of reference.113 First, the CTE
must study “the effect of environmental measures on market access” while focusing on
developing countries and least developed countries, and identify situations where
reducing or eliminating trade barriers, “would benefit trade, the environment and
development.”114 The Doha Ministerial Declaration mandates that the CTE also address
the TRIPS agreement and labeling requirements for environmental purposes.115
IV.

ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES IN GATT AND THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION BODY’S IMPACT
ON TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

A. Article XX Exceptions
In addition to the reference to environmental concerns in the Preamble to the Agreement
Establishing the WTO, the GATT also has several environmental safeguards woven into various
exceptions clauses.116
1. The Nondiscrimination Provisions
111
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Annex 1 A to the WTO Agreement contains GATT 1994 which is a series of
amendments and understandings on the interpretation of certain provisions of the original version
of GATT 1947.117 The multilateral trading system strives for nondiscrimination based upon two
fundamental concepts: the most favored nation (MFN) principal and the national treatment
principal.118 The MFN, found in Article I of GATT, prohibits applying different tariff schedules
for the same product to different Members, by requiring that “any advantage, favour [sic],
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or designed
for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.”119 Article III of
GATT contains the national treatment clause, which “acts to reinforce the tariff bindings made
pursuant to Article II by limiting the circumstances in which it is permissible for a nation to
provide treatment for domestic goods in its national legislation and programs which is more
favorable than that for imported goods . . . .”120 The relevant portion of Article III states that
“products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic
products.”121 Article XI restricts discrimination in the form of non-tariff barriers (NTB):
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective
through quotas, import or export license or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by
any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting
party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other
contracting party.122
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2. The “Environmental” Exception of GATT
Article I, III, and XI interact with each other, preventing almost every conceivable
discriminatory tactic.123 However, some discriminatory trade regulations will qualify for
exceptions. Article XX implicitly allows limited environmental exemptions for violations
occurring under Articles I, III, and XI.124
Article XX is composed of two main parts, the introductory clause (chapeau) and the list
of exceptions detailing the article’s scope.125 The chapeau to Article XX allows for the adoption
and enforcement of domestic laws that are discriminatory if they are within the article’s scope,
“[s]ubject to the requirement that measures are not applied . . . [arbitrarily or amount to]
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or . . .
disguised [as a] restriction on international trade . . . .”126 The relevant scope of Article XX
includes measures in paragraph (b) that are “necessary to protected human, animal or plant life or
health”127 and those in paragraph (g) “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.”128
B. Case Study: Environmental Exceptions to GATT
Discriminatory domestic legislation claimed to be exempt from Articles I, III, or XI must
pass muster under Article XX.129 The GATT panels and the WTO Appellate Body interpreted
Article XX on several occasions, leading to a consistent and reliable reading of the terms
contained within paragraphs (b) and (g).130 The paragraph (b) analysis deals mainly with
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construing the word “necessary.”131 The paragraph (g) inquiry must first focus on whether the
trade measure involves the “conservation of an exhaustible natural resource.”132 Second, if the
panel determines that it is a conservation measure, the panel then must then decide weather the
measure is “relating to” the conservation.133 Third, the panel must determine whether the
legislation aimed at foreigners works “in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption.”134 The three main issues concerning paragraph (g) were addressed first in the
Tuna Dolphin cases and then refined in the United States – Reformulated Gasoline case and the
Shrimp Turtle case.135
1. The Tuna Dolphin Cases : Reconciling Environmental Measures with the
GATT
a. Tuna Dolphin I
The United States imposed a unilateral ban in accordance with the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (MMPA) upon the importation of yellowfin tuna products that killed an
unacceptable quantity of dolphins during harvesting.136 Mexican fishermen were adversely
affected by the import restrictions, and in 1991, Mexico filed a grievance with the GATT
alleging violations of Articles III, XI, and XIII.137 The United States countered the Article III
attack by maintaining that the restrictive actions were justified under the national treatment
clause because United States fishermen were subject to the same regulations as the Mexican
fishermen.138 The GATT panel concluded that the MMPA regulations did not apply to tuna
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products within the meaning of Article III (which applies only to the imported product itself and
not the production process) and were therefore mere regulations on tuna harvesting that had no
effect on tuna as a product.139 Furthermore, the panel noted that the MMPA regulations
amounted to discriminatory trade measures because domestic and foreign vessels were subject to
different regulatory schemes.140 Domestic vessels were given arbitrary preset limit on dolphin
kills, but the allowable dolphin kills for foreign vessels were based on a percentage of dolphin
kills by domestic vessels for the present year.141 Consequently, foreigners did not know their
allowable kill limit until after harvest.142
(1). The “necessary” Clause of Article XX (b)
The United States argued that the regulations of the MMPA were justified under the
Article XX paragraph (b) or alternatively XX paragraph (g) exceptions.143 The panel’s analysis
undertook the inquiry of whether the word “necessary” in the GATT Article XX section (b)
applied to measures taken to protect resources outside the borders of a nation if no reasonable
alternative exists.144 Furthermore, the panel concluded that while Article XX does not expressly
limit the exception to domestic action, the United States’ regulation did not merit a Article XX
exception because there were other multilateral options that remained as possible solutions that
would be less abrasive to GATT.145
(2). The “relating to” Clause of Article XX (g)
The Panel then moved to an analysis of the GATT Article XX paragraph (g).146 Focusing
on the language “relating to,” the panel cited previous decisions that construed the term to mean,
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“primarily aimed at” the conservation of an exhaustible resource.147 The panel ultimately
decided that the contested measures were not allowed under Article XX paragraph (g) either.148
(3). Conclusion
The panel’s decision, while it did not uphold a unilateral embargo, ultimately benefited
the dolphin population by promoting a multilateral approach to conservation and regulation.149
Subsequent to the adjudication of the first Tuna Dolphin case the United States and Mexico
entered into the Agreement for the Reductions of Dolphin Mortality in the Eastern Pacific Ocean
in 1992, which establishes declining a per-vessel limit on dolphin kills and requires observers on
large purse-seine tuna vessels.150 The Agreement also created a research foundation, which
engages in programs to develop new fishing techniques to lessen and eventually eliminate
dolphin mortality.151
b. Tuna Dolphin II
The panel subsequently revisited the dispute in 1994 when the European Economic
Community (EEC) and the Netherlands challenged the validity of secondary embargoes, on
processors of tuna caught by vessels not complying with the MMPA rules, and alleged them to
be contrary to Articles III and XI.152 The United States justified the regulations, termed
“intermediary nation embargoes,” under Article XX (b) and (g) exceptions.153 Again, the panel
reiterated that Article III was not applicable since the regulations were directed at harvesting and
not the product itself.154 The panel then concluded that the ban on imports constituted a
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prohibition or restriction, which was inconsistent with Article XI.155 The panel then applied
Article XX (g) and outlined an important three step analysis:
First, it had to be determined whether the policy in respect of which these provisions were invoked
fell within the range of policy to conserve exhaustible resources.
Second, it had to be determined whether the measure for which the exception was being invoked .
. . was “related to” the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, and whether it was made
effective “in conjunction” with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.
Third, it had to be determined whether the measure was applied in conformity with the
requirement set out in the preamble to article XX . . . .156

Concerning the first question, the panel noted that anything capable of potential exhaustion
constituted a resource.157 This is an important ruling in respect to Article XX (g). The panel’s
broad interpretation of Article XX includes, as exceptions, policies protecting almost anything
natural (coal, trees, water, dolphins etc.) provided that the policy is not dependant on whether
present stocks of the resource are depleted,158 regardless of whether the resource is located
beyond a nation’s borders.159 The panel affirmed that previous interpretations of the term
“relating to” meant “primarily aimed at” the conservation of natural resources, and that the term
“in conjunction with” implied “primarily aimed at” promulgating regulations on domestic
production and consumption.160 The panel then applied Article XX (b) using the same three step
analysis above and substituted the relevant portions for “protect human, animal or plant life or
heath.”161 The panel found that the restrictions were not justified under Article XX (g) or (b).162
2. Reformulated Gasoline
a. Introduction
The Clean Air Act of 1990 established two regulation programs regarding the
importation of foreign gasoline and domestic sales of gasoline in various areas based
155
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upon the areas’ pollution levels.163 The first program applies to ozone “nonattainment
areas” and only allows sale of reformulated gasoline in those districts. Locations with
extremely high levels of ozone pollution (generally large cities) or those areas that have
opted in by request of their state governor are designated as “nonattainment areas.”164
The second program is applicable to areas that have not experienced high levels of air
pollution, which includes the rest of the United States.165 The second program permits
the sale of conventional gasoline in any location not designated a “nonattainment”
area.166 The act establishes a separate toxic emission allowance for each refiner and
blender based on the classification of either reformulated or conventional gasoline using
1990 as the base year for emission levels.167
Brazil and Venezuela filed a compliant with the WTO Dispute Resolution Body
alleging that the regulations promulgated by the Untitled States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) pursuant to the Clean Air Act violated Article I and III of the GATT.168
The complaint was based upon the disparity of treatment between foreign and domestic
refiners regarding the availability of methods for computing an individual baseline, which
determines allowable levels of pollutants contained in the gasoline.169 Domestic refiners
were allowed three different methods of computation before they were required to use the
statutory baseline whereas foreign refiners were allowed to use only the first method and
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then forced to accept the statutory baseline developed by the EPA.170 Ultimately the
panel held in favor of Brazil and Venezuela, concluding that the EPA regulations were
not consistent with Article III (4) and could not be justified under either paragraphs (b)
(d) or (g) of Article XX.171 However, the panel did conclude that clean air was an
exhaustible resource, which is a limited victory for environmentalists.172 The United
States appealed the ruling to the Appellate Body, which affirmed the panel discussion but
on different grounds, establishing a new framework analysis for Article XX
exceptions.173
b. The “relating to” Clause of Article XX (g)
The Appellate Body first proceeded to determine whether the “measure” was
“related to” conservation under Article XX paragraph (g).174 The term “measures” as
used in Article XX refers the specific provision of a rule which conflicts with Article III
due to the lack of an even application between domestic and foreign production and
consumption, not necessarily because of an unequal treatment.175 The Appellate Body
interpreted the chapeau to Article XX to mean that the conflicting measure (not the legal
determination of unfavorable) must be analyzed, and it ruled that that panel had erred
here in its analysis.176 The Appellate Body agreed with the panel’s interpretation of
“relating to” as meaning “primarily aimed at” the “conservation of exhaustible natural
resources” but cautioned that it is not to be used as the ultimate “litmus test” for
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compliance with Article XX.177 However, the Appellate body disagreed with the panel’s
application of Article XX (g) and concluded that the United States’ measurers were
“primarily aimed” at the conservation of natural resources due to the Clean Air Act’s
dependence upon on the Gasoline Rule to achieve its objectives.178
c. The “in conjunction with” Clause of Article XX (g)
Once the “measure” is deemed as being “relating to” conservation, the panel must
then assess whether it operates “in conjunction with” domestic restrictions.179 The panel
indicated that “in conjunction with” may be read as “together with” or “jointly with”
domestic regulations on production or consumption of natural resources.180 The
Appellate Body concluded that since the restrictions on domestic gasoline are established
concurrently with imported gasoline, the regulatory scheme satisfies the requirements of
“in conjunction with” and the fact that they are unequal is irrelevant.181 Moreover, if the
regulations were required to be identical there would be no dispute under Article III and
therefore no need for an exception under Article XX.182
d. The Chapeau Analysis
After the regulation is determined to fall within the domain of Article XX (g) the
next level of analysis concerns the chapeau’s prohibition of exceptions that evidence “(a)
‘arbitrary discrimination’ (between countries where the same conditions prevail); (b)
‘unjustifiable discrimination’ (with the same qualifier); or (c) ‘disguised restriction’ on
international trade.”183 The Appellate body attempted resolve the debate as to whether
the phrase “between countries where the same conditions prevail” concerns “conditions
177
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in importing and exporting countries, or only to conditions in exporting countries.”184
The phrase was determined to imply application to all GATT Articles, contradicting
previous GATT panel decisions interpreting it as only referring to the MFN principle of
Article I.185 The Appellate body found that several alternate measures existed, which
were equally available and less discriminatory and held that the Gasoline Rule was both a
“disguised restriction” and an “unjustifiable discrimination” on trade.186
The Appellate Body developed a novel approach to analyzing and resolving
Article XX disputes in Reformulated Gasoline.187 The Appellate Body shifted away from
the narrow construction of the enumerated paragraphs of Article XX and expanded the
scope of the constraints.188 Thus, thrusting the crux of the analysis back to the chapeau,
which allows Article XX exceptions as long as they are not a “unjustifiable
discrimination” or a “disguised restriction” on trade.189 The new approach appears to
allow more exceptions into GATT including environmental measures that fall under
Article XX paragraphs (b) and (g) as long as there are no less discriminatory means to
accomplish the same ends.190
3. The Shrimp Turtle Case
The Shrimp Turtle case raises some of the same issues as Tuna Dolphin I and II
and comes to relatively similar conclusions. However, the real importance of this case is
the submission of unsolicited amicus briefs by various NGOs in defense of the United
States’ ban on the importation of shrimp by fisherman who failed to use turtle excluder

184

Id at 50.
Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 164, at 50-51; see also Kennedy, supra note 149, at 446 n.404.
186
Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 164, at 63.
187
Kennedy, supra note 149, at 447.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
See id.
185

29

devices to protect endangered species of turtle.191 The case is also noted for the
Appellate Body’s articulation and sequencing of the Article XX analysis.192
The original panel held that only information, which the panel seeks may be
considered.193 It also held in favor of Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand that section 609
United States of Public Law 101-162, requiring the use of turtle excluder devices, was in
violation of the article XI: 1 of GATT and did not warrant an exception under Article
XX.194
a. Non-Member Submissions
Several NGOs including the Center for Marine Conservation, the Center for
International Environmental Law, and the World Wide Fund for Nature submitted briefs
to the panel and to both of the parties.195 The panel initially declined to consider the
briefs because they were not requested by the panel.196 The panel reasoned that allowing
the submission would aggravate the dispute resolution process according to Article 13 of
the Dispute Resolution Understanding (DSU), but invited either party to include any
information in their own briefs.197 Upon appeal, the Appellate Body concluded that the
panel is only legally required to accept information from the parties to a dispute and
interested third party Members.198 It also noted that panel has no obligation to consider
unrequested outside information.199 However, the Appellate Body found the panel’s
conclusion (that the panel may consider only information that is sought) was an overly
191
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narrow interpretation of Article 13 paragraph 2 of the DSU, which states that “[p]anels
may seek information from any relevant source.”200 The Appellate Body reasoned that
when Article 13 of the DSU is read in conjunction with Articles 11 and 12 of the DSU, it
allows the panel discretion to accept and consider unrequested information submitted by
non-members.201
b. The Article XX Exceptions
Furthermore, the Appellate Body cited the panel’s error to correctly sequence the
Article XX analysis of the disputed regulation.202 The Appellate Body criticized the
panel for moving directly to the chapeau of Article XX, thereby forgoing a classification
of the exception under one of the Article XX paragraphs.203 The Appellate Body
reiterated the standard two-tiered analysis as defined in Reformulated Gasoline: (1)
determine whether the violation falls under one the enumerated categories outlined in the
paragraphs following Article XX and (2) evaluate the measure under the constraints of
the chapeau.204 Sequencing the analysis in this order allows the panel flexibility in its
determination of what “measures” constitute a “unjustifiable discrimination” or
“disguised restrictions on trade” depending upon what paragraph the exception may fall
under.205 The panel explains that what may constitute an unacceptable level of
discrimination for a measure relating to protection of public morals may be completely
different than that for a measurer pertaining to products of prison labor.206
4. Conclusion
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Each of the aforementioned cases played a distinct role in establishing a sound
foundation for the analysis of Article XX exceptions.207 The Dispute Resolution Body
has increased the possibility of sustaining environmental exceptions by establishing a
regiment for the application of Article XX, which requires the categorization of
exceptions and then the application of the chapeau.208 Furthermore, the Appellate Body
articulated a balanced approach to the issue of submissions when extended latitude to
NGOs and MEAs by providing that they may request to submit amicus briefs to the
Dispute Resolution Body on behalf of environmental issues, but then granted the panel
discretion to accept or reject the submissions.209
MEAs that have been granted observer status in the CTE may be better positioned
than other NGOs, to influence a dispute resolution panel’s decision to allow unsolicited
submissions, because of their increased access to the WTO process. 210 Moreover, the
impact of extending observer status to MEAs is compounded because of the potential
impact on international law. The dispute settlement panels, claimants, and respondents
have all cited reports from the CTE.211 Regular participation by MEAs in CTE meetings
would garner influence for environmental constituencies in international law by directly
impacting reports and policies that are cited in binding WTO dispute resolution panel
decisions.
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V.

TRADE RELATED RESTRICTIONS IN MEAS AND THEIR IMPACT UPON THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM

A. Trade Measure or Trade Related?
According to statistics released by the WTO and UNEP only 38 MEAs, a small
fraction of the 238 currently in force, have trade related provisions.212 There are also
other MEAs not included in the above tally, which impose notable effects upon trade
because of the overarching effect of the regulations within the treaty, not the manner in
which they are enforced.213
MEAs without specific trade measures can still affect the multilateral trading
system indirectly.214 These treaties contain no restrictive trade measures but still create
waves in the pool of international trade by raising compliance costs. For example, the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Kyoto Protocol
impacts trade in consumer goods, industrial products, and fossil fuels by regulating
greenhouse gas emissions.215
B. The Structure and Impact of MEA Trade Measures
Trade Measures in MEAs can appear in several formats: (1) reporting
requirements; (2) labeling requirements; (3) notification and consent procedures; (4)
import and/or export bans; and (5) taxes or government procurement.216 In the debate
over conflicting WTO and MEA trade measures, it is generally not acknowledged that
MEAs bundle trade regulations with positive measures to mitigate the potential effect on
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trade and actually stimulate development.217 These trade measures are commonly linked
with other non-trade devices, such as technical or financial assistance, to create an
optimal outcome through a balanced approach.218 The CTE encourages environmentally
friendly technology transfer but fails to address the problem of underfunding that plagues
MEAs, which thwarts the availability of positive measures and requires the continuation
of trade measures.219 In fact, the CTE notes that effective MEAs support the multilateral
trading system by both addressing “environmental problems of concern to the
international community” and preventing “disputes from arising” within the WTO.220
MEA trade measures could potentially conflict with the GATT rules.221 The CTE
encourages the use of positive measures to either reduce or replace trade measures.222
While positive measures are becoming increasingly more common in MEAs, due to
underfunding and lack of multilateral support from developing countries in the area of
technology transfer, it seems that MEA trade measures are not going to dissipate any time
soon.223 When a dispute arises between WTO Members, stemming from their obligations
under a MEA, the CTE prefers that the parties use the environmental treaty’s dispute
resolution process, rather than filing a complaint with the WTO dispute resolution
panel.224 However, this does not address the problem of a dispute arising between WTO
Members when one Member is a party to the MEA from which the dispute arises and the
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other Member is not a party to the MEA.225 This scenario has not yet materialized,
although, it has sparked heated debate and raised many concerns and questions regarding
the supremacy of GATT versus MEAs in the context of international law.226 Fortunately,
the debate over supremacy appears to becoming a moot point due to the proliferation of
membership in MEAs, which on average outnumbers that of WTO membership.227 The
party/non-party debate continues to be an issue with the United States, which has recently
backed out of the Kyoto Protocol and is a non-party to several other MEAs.228
VI.

EXTENDING OBSERVER STATUS TO MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENT AGREEMENTS: THE
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

A. What is Observer Status?
Since 1997, the CTE has generally held three meetings per year with additional
special sessions and symposia.229 The WTO has granted invitee status to UNEP and six
MEAs to participate in several of the CTE’s special sessions.230 Requests for observer
status to a particular WTO body, such as the CTE, are granted on a case-by-case or ad
hoc basis.231 Organizations can also be granted observer status by invitation on a caseby-case basis.232 Observers enjoy only limited privileges in WTO sessions. They may
speak if invited to do so, but that invitation does not include the right to circulate papers,
which can only be granted by an additional specific invitation.233 Furthermore, observers
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are allowed to receive papers which are circulated, but they are expressly prohibited from
participating in the decision making process.234
B. A Chronological Analysis of the Role MEAs in the WTO
1. 1996: The Beginning
The CTE embarked upon a course of action that would lead to the enhanced
information exchange and communication between the WTO and outside constituencies
by extending observer status to fourteen IGOs in 1996.235 The CTE also granted observer
status, in 1996, to several IGOs on an ad hoc basis, subject to final approval by the
General Council.236 However, thisad hoc approach is an ineffective solution because it
does not allow the CTE to take full advantage of the MEA’s expertise in international
environmental law.237
2. 1997-1998: The WTO Grants Limited Observer Status to MEAs and
Discusses Linkages
After the initial report was issued in 1996, the CTE developed a “cluster
approach” for subsequent years to better deal with the themes of market access (Agenda
Items 2, 3, and 4) and linkages between trade and the environment (Agenda Items 1, 5, 7,
and 8). 238 Discussion topics for the year are determined at the last regular meeting of the
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previous year and are usually based upon several of the Agenda Items set out in the
Decision on Trade and the Environment and sometimes focus on a specific theme.239
The CTE extended observer status to three non-governmental organizations in
1997.240 Furthermore, the WTO made a landmark move by granting ad hoc observer
status two environmental conventions: the UN Framework Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES).241
The July 1998 meeting of the CTE focused on linkages between trade and the
environment and sponsored an Information Session with the Secretariats of several MEAs.242
The meeting improved the information exchange between groups by disseminating information
to Members regarding developments in multilateral environmental agreements, which were
relevant to the CTE.243 The CTE also extended ad hoc observer status to the World Intellectual
Property Organization and the International Plant Genetic Resource Institute that year.244
Several major developments occurred during the following year, including more grants of
observer status and a symposium involving the relationship between MEAs and the WTO.245
3. 1999: The WTO’s High Level Symposium
The CTE continued to expand on the information exchange between the WTO and MEAs
in 1999.246 It held another Information Session with the Secretariats of five MEAs in which
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their representatives were invited to submit papers and give presentations.247 The session
focused on sustainable development, and one theme involved learning how trade measures in
MEAs work.248 Armed with this information, the CTE hoped to foster a better understanding of
the MEA’s role within the multilateral trading system.249 In addition, the CTE extended ad hoc
observer status to several more NGOs and the UNFCCC in 1999.250
The WTO held a symposium on trade and the environment in Geneva during March of
1999.251 The symposium covered a variety of trade related issues and formed three panels which
held specialized discussions on: (1) linkages between trade and environment polices; (2)
synergies between trade liberalization, environmental protection, and sustainable development;
and (3) interaction between trade and environment.252 Klaus Töpfer, Executive Director of
UNEP emphasized a holistic approach to dealing with international environmental issues.253 He
declared that the impacts of debt, poverty, technology transfer, and sustainable development
could not be isolated from environmental issues.254 Töpfer also stressed that the WTO could not
assume the entire responsibility alone and pledged to increase UNEP’s role in the multilateral
trading system.255
4. A New Millenium: Increased UNEP Involvement and Clarification of MEA Dispute
Resolution, Technical Assistance, and Capacity Building

247

Id. para. 3. The CTE received presentations and papers from: CITES; “the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer [Montreal Protocol]; the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
[UNFCCC]; the Intergovernmental Forum on Forest [IFF]; and the International Tropical Timber Organization
[ITTO].” Id.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id. para. 4. The CTE extended observer status to: “the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas [ICCAT]; the Islamic Development Bank; the South Pacific Forum; the South Asian Fisheries Development
Centre.” CTE, 1999 Report, supra note 246, para. 4.
251
See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Report on the WTO’s High-Level Symposium on Trade
and the Environment, (Mar. 15-16, 1999) http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Id.

38

The CTE held two information sessions with the secretariats of MEAs in 2000.256 The
first MEA Information Session took place in July and covered trade related developments.257
The session consisted of presentations and papers, which discussed the linkages between
upcoming WTO trade program agendas and MEAs.258 The Director-General of the WTO and
the Executive Director of UNEP both participated in the second information session held in
October.259 The presence of both directors signaled a firm resolution by both the WTO and
UNEP to continue to interact with MEAs and nurture the relationships between all three
factions.260 The second session, which also spawned papers and presentations from MEAs,261
helped to increase the understanding of the relationships within the CTE by identifying
“synergies” and enhancing “mutual supportiveness.”262 Furthermore, the sessions provided an
opportunity to develop and enhance institutional bonds between the Secretariats of the MEAs,
UNEP and the WTO. 263
The CTE’s June 2001 meeting began with another Information Session with MEA
Secretariats, this time to heighten the understanding of the dispute settlement measures and
compliance provisions within MEAs and the WTO.264 The WTO, UNEP, and MEAs
collaborated to produce a background document which outlined the compliance and dispute
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resolution provisions in each of the following MEAs: the UNFCCC; the Montreal Protocol; the
Basel Convention; the Rotterdam Convention; the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants (Stockholm Convention); the CBD; the UNFSA; and the CITES.265 This session
provided a forum in which the WTO, UNEP, and MEA Secretariats could network, develop
linkages, and promote synergy between all of the different entities.266
The next CTE Information Session with the MEA Secretariats was held in June 2002 and
focused on technical assistance, capacity building, and information exchange.267 The MEA
representatives contributed to the meeting by presenting their current technical assistance and
capacity building activities.268 UNEP distributed a paper at the June 2002 meeting, on how to
“enhance synergies and mutual supportiveness” between “trade and environmental policies, rules
and institutions.”269 The report circulated by UNEP emphasized the need to increase institutional
cooperation and called for both more formal and informal interaction between the WTO and
MEAs.270 UNEP underscored the value of granting observer status to MEAs, in various WTO
bodies including the CTE, which it opined would thereby increase information exchange and
foster more efficient cooperation.271 UNEP bolstered the argument to extend observer status to
MEAs by recalling that several of their Secretariats participated regularly in annual information
sessions and offered papers and statements to the CTE.272 The report further postulated that
increased information exchange, with regard to each group’s dispute settlement process, would
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assist in creating a deeper understanding of objectives and compliance mechanisms within
MEAs.273 UNEP lobbied on behalf of the Convention on Biological Diversity to urge the WTO
to approve its request for observer status in the Committee on Agriculture and the TRIPS
Council by claiming that the move would help identify linkages and promote cooperation.274
Moreover, UNEP noted that each of the ten CTE Agenda Items contained biodiversity related
issues.275 Therefore, granting observer status to the CBD Secretariat would enhance the WTO by
providing a level of expertise in the area of biodiversity.
5. 2003: Cancún and Beyond
The CTE confirmed the appointment of its new chairman, Ambassador Peter Br o, in
February of 2003.276 Several other developments occurred that year, including a symposium, the
circulation of various documents, and the release of CTE’s report to the WTO Ministerial
Conference in Cancún.277 In 2003, the committeefocused mainly on market access, the TRIPS
agreement, and environmental labeling requirements.278 It did not admit any more MEAs or
even address the observer status of institutions, which were still pending the General Council’s
approval.279
The WTO held a Symposium on the Challenges ahead on the Road to Cancún in midJune of 2003, which devoted several sessions to primarily environmental concerns.280 The first
session began when the mediator, Mr. Richard Tarasofsky, facilitated a discussion on Paragraph
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31 (i) of the Doha Development Agenda.281 He indicated that the relationship between the WTO
and MEAs was particularly problematic.282 Tarasofsky also accused WTO members of avoiding
the issue of MEA party/non-party conflicts within the WTO and admonished Members for not
addressing non-specific trade measures contained within MEAs.283 Tarasofsky charged both the
WTO and MEAs with the responsibility of address the chilling effect of WTO policy on MEA
development.284
The Fifth Ministerial Conference began in Cancún, Mexico on September 10, 2003, and
negotiations lasted through September 15, 2003.285 The Doha Development Agenda continued
to dominate the negotiations with an emphasis on least developed countries.286 The Conference
separated in to different focus groups including one on “other issues” which housed the
negotiations on trade and the environment.287 On day two of the Conference, the talks focused
on granting observer status to MEAs, eco-labeling, and the relation between TRIPS, the CBD,
and protection of traditional knowledge.288 The following day, the negotiations continued to
expand and near consensus upon issues dealing with relationships between TRIPS paragraph
27.3 and the Doha Declaration paragraph 19 (relating to the patenting of plants and animals, the
CBD, and traditional knowledge).289 However, on day four, the Chairperson Ernesto Derbez
sensed the potentially irreconcilable differences on the Singapore and Agricultural Issues and
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warned the conference of the looming deadline for consensus.290 Unfortunately, the Cancún
Fifth Ministerial Conference ended on September 14, 2003 without the Members reaching a
consensus.291
The inability of Members’ to reach a consensus at Cancún does not spell failure for the
issues presented in the Doha Development Agenda. Fortunately, as Mr. Derbez noted Cancún
was not a launching nor a concluding round, and the Members still have until January 1, 2005 to
reconcile differences on the difficult issues.292 While the deadline approaches, Members still
must reach a consensus on (1) “clarifying the existing relationships between existing WTO rules
and specific trade obligations set out in multilateral environmental agreements;” (2) information
exchange between the WTO and MEAs; (3) “the criteria for granting observer status;” and (4)
“the liberalization of trade in environmental goods and services.”293
VII. CONCLUSION
A. Where Do We Go After Cancún?
Several theorists have suggested the creation of a World Environmental Organization
(WEO) to coordinate MEAs and provide a consolidated forum to regulate environmental
degradation. Scholars such as Daniel Esty, professor of law at Yale University, and Frank
Biermann, of the Potsdam Institute of Climate Impact Research have proposed, advocated, and
analyzed the creation and potential roles of an international organization dedicated solely to the
environment.294 The proposed WEO would house environmental treaties, regulate infractions,
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create policy, disseminate information, conduct research, and coordinate multilateral efforts to
preserve the environment.295
Other scholars recommend that the WTO amend the GATT Article XX to allow
Members to act in compliance with MEA trade measures. George William Mugwanya proposes
an addition to Article XX that would list unilateral measures restricting trade taken pursuant to
MEAs as a viable exception to violations occurring under the GATT Article XI.296 Mugwanya
recognizes that “MEAs and the GATT have equal status as treaties” and conflicts would
therefore be subject to rules of the Vienna Convention in which the later signed treaty is
supreme.297 This conflict could potentially cause the collapse of the GATT by subordinating it to
any later signed treaty that contains contradicting trade measures.298
Kenneth F. McCallion and H. Rajan Sharma, of the law firm Goodkind, Labaton, Rudoff
& Sucharow LLP in New York, propose the creation of an international environmental court.299
They cite the failure of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to address environmental issues
and the non-binding dispute resolution systems currently in place in many MEAs as reasons to
establish an international environmental court.300 McCallion and Sharma also specify the lack of
standing for individuals, corporations, and NGOs in the ICJ as perpetuating acquiescence to
environmental issues in the international forum.301
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The Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE) recommend that the UN handle any WTO/ MEA
related disputes.302 The rationale behind this position stems from the fact that the UN is
competent in trade, the environment and sustainability.303 The FoEE contends that the “WTO is
not an environmentally policy-making body” and fears “that negotiations under WTO auspices
risk undermining the status of MEA’s.”304 FoEE calls for the immediate granting of observer
status for all MEAs in all WTO bodies and the strengthening of compliance and dispute
settlement mechanisms in MEAs to strike a better balance between the organizations.305 FoEE
further demands that the MEAs be recognized as consistent with the WTO. 306
B. Proposals from the Author
There are many proposed solutions by both environmentalists and those from the trade
camp. The proposals range from the creation of new intergovernmental organizations to an
international court of environmental law.307 Moreover, others have considered amendments to
GATT to create specific exceptions for multilateral environmental agreements, and still others
have called for the expansion of the WTO or the UN to police the environment.308 These
solutions should not be considered mutually exclusive. They can be integrated to create an
effective, fair and efficient system of environmental protection that will accommodate both
environmentalists and trade purists.
The integration of these proposals should first establish an organization, which could be
formed under the UN, WTO, or independently, which would house the secretariats of the
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multilateral environmental agreements and coordinate their collective policymaking.309 Next, the
legal structure of current MEAs must be assessed and reconciled with WTO through a series of
compromises consisting of both WTO amendments to GATT and similarly structured
amendments to provisions contained within MEAs.310 Third, the judiciary must possess
jurisdiction over environmental matters, have the power to render binding decisions, and avail
standing to states, NGOs, Corporations, and individuals.311 Improvements to the adjudication
process would require modification of the ICJ, or the creation of a new judiciary composed of
representation from the WTO, the UN and MEAs.312 Regardless of the legal structure, any new
entity must work in close coordination with the UN, WTO and MEAs.
Finally, the WTO must recognize the value that MEAs have to offer in the multilateral
trading system. It is necessary for the WTO to extend permanent observer status to MEAs in
order to ensure adequate information exchange, the development of synergies, and the
exploitation of the specialties that MEAs have to offer in the area of environmental law.313
Extending observer status to MEAs in the WTO will promote a more informed and educated
decision making process by WTO Members with regard to the environmental consequences of
their trade decisions.314
Preserving both the environment and the world’s natural resources is a task that everyone
must undertake. The environment is an increasingly important issue that must be addressed in
this period of rapid economic growth and proportionally rapid increase in pollution, natural
resource depletion, and environmental degradation.315 Environmental issues need to be dealt
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with on a global basis to avoid the promulgation of “race to the bottom” legislation, “competition
in laxity” and “eco dumping.”316 After all every one has to share this planet, including current
and further generations of both developed and developing nations. Whether you support the
Wold Trade Organization, a non-governmental organization, a multilateral environmental
agreement, or even a corporation there is only one way to achieve harmony between trade and
the environment. We all must cooperate on a global level and comply with the principals of
intergenerational equity in order to preserve the natural environment and all its resources for the
future generations.317
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